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MISUNDERSTANDINGS CONCERNING INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION POLICIES 
BY 
JAN TINBERGEN* 
1 WHOSE MISUNDERSTANDINGS? 
In human relations misunderstandings are a fairly frequent phenomenon. A 
considerable part of them is the consequence of the inaccurate formulation 
of thoughts by one or more of the participants in a debate, whether in spoken 
or in written form. In an article honouring Professor Hennipman and dealing 
with misunderstandings it is highly unlikely, if not excluded, that these 
misunderstandings will have been caused by an inaccurate formulation by 
Hennipman. This statement may be checked by carefully reading one of 
the rare book-length publications of this leading economist, available thanks 
to two of his former students and present colleagues, Van den Doel and 
Heertje (1977). Having chosen my subject, I tried hard to Fred an occasion 
to quote Hennipman directly in the context of my pre-chosen topic, but I 
did not succeed. It required an effort even to find an example of difference 
of opinion - something possible even without inaccurate formulations being 
involved. And it remains doubtful whether the example I am going to quote 
constitutes uch a difference, since it is not based on an explicit pronounce- 
ment of our esteemed author. My example concerns the relevance of fixing 
frontiers of economic science - frontiers beyond which we have left the terri- 
tory of economic science. I for one think frontiers between various tradi- 
tionaUy defined sciences (or disciplines) are not relevant; what is relevant is 
to leave the territory of science or scientific thinking generally. The sentence 
which might imply Hennipman's disagreement with the statement just made 
contains the expression "non-economic value judgements" which are con- 
trasted to "economic science" (Hennipman, 1977, p. 42). 
The misunderstandings to be dealt with in this essay are not attributable, 
then, to Hennipman, but to others, including myself; and my way ofhonour- 
ing him is to attempt o approach my "promotor" (in the Dutch sense) in 
accuracy. 
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The way I propose to deal with my subject needs some explanation. 
Considering the theory of income distribution policies as part of the science 
of economics and the latter as part of science generally, I am going to 
search for misunderstandings not only in income distribution policies (as 
mentioned, for brevity's ake, in the essay's title) but all the way down to 
scientific thinking in general, as far as is deemed relevant to my subject. 
2 MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON VALUE JUDGEMENTS IN SCIENCE 
Many authors like to defend the thesis that science cannot be "objective" or 
"free from value judgements." In my opinion this thesis is incorrect and 
Hennipman (1977, pp. 82, 83) has succeeded better than other economists 
in drawing the dividing line between positive (value-free) and normative 
statements, i.e. statements subject to value judgements. Correctly, in my 
opinion, he accuses Little of a needlessly complicated and misleading state- 
ment when the latter writes "given our value judgements, it must decrease the 
economic welfare of a particular individual if we force him to work where he 
does not want to." The dividing line may also be illustrated by (1) positive 
statements about an individual's preferences which on many occasions can be 
observed and the observations checked and (2) value judgements as soon as a 
social welfare function is chosen. The only point of doubt about the possi- 
bility of positive scientific statements being value-laden may be in the choice 
of subjects dealt with, as set out by Myrdal (1930, 1972). 
Observations regarding an individual's preferences are generally accepted 
to be possible in the form of finding situations or states of equal welfare 
(or utility). Differences of opinion occur when it comes to measuring the 
level of welfare; here we have economists who deny the possibility of 
measurement and other economists who do not deny that possibility (cf. 
Van Praag, 1968; Kuipers, 1979). 
The role played by observation i the process of testing a scientific theory 
is vital, and probably the most impressive xample of that role is given by 
physics. A popular misunderstanding around empkical testing seems worth 
being discussed for a while. It is not always understood by laymen that test- 
ing is a one-way activity in the sense that a theory can be shown to be 
erroneous (it can be rejected), but it cannot be "shown" to be correct. The 
possibility for other, competing, theories to fit the facts must be left open. 
In other words, additional reasons for accepting one o f  two competing 
theories are needed. Often such additional reasons may be' further elaboration 
and testing; this is even the routine behaviour of many scientists. There is 
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room for a different approach, however: for instance, the adherence to an 
additional principle. A famous example is the rejection, by Albert Einstein, of 
stochastic theories; another his preference for simple theories) 
An example referring to the measurement of utility by Van Praag (1971) is 
that so far an equally good fit of his observations is obtained with the aid of 
two functions: (1) the integrated log-normal distribution function, preferred 
by him and (2) the logarithm of income (corrected for compensation of 
effort) which I prefer. Van Praag's preference isbased on the applicability of 
a number of mathematical operations, whereas my preference is based on the 
economic ondition that the function's econd derivative should be negative 
for all values of corrected income. This condition is not fulfilled by Van 
Praag's function. 
Another popular misunderstanding, not restricted to laymen, is that in 
order to eliminate an undesired phenomenon or development one has to 
"know its causes." In order to avoid difficulties in the definition of the 
concept of causes, let us choose a simple interpretation and assume that by 
causes we mean the factors which together can explain the development 
under discussion from a time to until the present ime point t. The point I 
want to remind the reader of is that knowledge of causes which cannot be 
changed is irrelevant. What we need to know, however, is what impact on the 
development under debate can be exerted by factors which can be changed, 
often called policy instruments. 
Let us now return to my thesis of the irrelevance of frontiers between 
sciences given different names. Hennipman touches upon this subject again 
in the source already quoted (1977, p. 85), where he quotes - evidently with 
agreement - Peter (1949), who stated that normative judgement of economic 
phenomena requires the cooperation of ethics, sociology, and economics. The 
relationship with my thesis consists of the doubt one may feel about the 
character of ethics. If ethics is not a science - which I tend to believe - then 
we are facing a frontier that is relevant: the frontier with ethics. The frontier 
between economics and sociology remains irrelevant if we consider both to 
be sciences - as I do. 
Finally, in this section, the question should be mentioned whether there is 
a difference in character between the natural and the social sciences, as main- 
rained by POtz and Neuhauser (1980). I, for one, do not agree with opinions 
expressed by several economists (from the German cultural area in particu- 
lar), that, for instance, measurement and the use of mathematical tools cannot 
1 Wheeler, in his Memoir on Einstein (1979) quotes the latter as having said repeatedly: 
"I still cannot believe that the good Lord plays dice." 
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be applied to sciences dealing with human beings. I do admit that a difference 
may exist with regard to complexity, 2 that is, the number and nature of 
variables and relationships involved. This may make it much more difficult 
to discover the invariants - the essence of scientific activity. Even so, the 
economist sometimes does encounter remarkably constant reaction patterns 
over long periods, such as the price elasticity of demand for beef or anchovy 
(Tinbergen, 1941; 1979). 
3 MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH REGARD TO ECONOMIC SCIENCE 
As a next step, let us concentrate on economic science in its positive or 
analytical form. A number of arbitrarily chosen examples will be dealt with, 
related to income distribution policies, as announced. 
1. Not unusual among economists is the opinion that production func- 
tions are "purely technological" relationships, indicating how much product 
is obtained from the combination of given quantities of production factors, 
such as natural resources, labour and capital. By now it seems to me to have 
become clear that psychological factors also come into play; the organization 
of a production process, such as the hierarchy of decision makers, may well 
affect labour satisfaction, and, through it, an individual's contribution to 
production. Claims for participation in the decision process are one expres- 
sion of this state of affairs; attempts to reorganize decision-making structures 
by using forward-looking managers constitute another. 
2. Turning to income distribution, an example of misunderstanding the 
complexity of the phenomenon called tertiary distribution has correctly been 
stated by Wolfson (1979) in a critique of the present author's quoting 
measurements of that distribution. In these measurements, he consequences 
of changes in the price system due to public expenditures have not been 
taken account of. 
3. Considering now the misunderstandings around the explanation of observ- 
2 Even S o, among the natural sciences meteorology is also characterized byan enormous 
number of variables. Moreover, some fundamental phenomena remain relevant even in 
very complicated mechanisms and often can be understood more easily with the aid of 
a macro-model than with the aid of a micro-model, where one "cannot see the forest 
because of the trees." One example is the identity of the balance on current account 
with foreign countries and the gap between expenditures and income of a nation. 
Another example is the role played by non-tradables in the analysis of the gap just 
mentioned. 
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ed income distribution, a first example concerns my own misunderstanding 
that all income differences may be explained by a "market heory," that is a 
theory using the demand for and the supply of each type of labour distin- 
guished as the only determinants. In such a market heory, demand factors 
and supply factors would be the only variables explaining income differences. 
Both Pen (1978) and Huppes (1977) have rightly pointed out that an addi- 
tional role is played by power. A good example can be found in the incomes 
derived from social security systems which have been created by legislation 
once a political majority in parliament had become favourable to such sys- 
tems. Later I was converted to similar ideas, stating that manager compensa- 
tions are the result of a "market" wherethe same sociological group is acting 
on both sides. What I use to call the "organizers of production," who vis-g-vis 
wage earners act On the demand side, is the group that is also acting on the 
supply side when bargaining on their own compensation takes place. This 
creates a "monopoloid" situation, containing an element of power. 
On one detail in Huppes' treatment I disagree with him, so we may hit 
upon another misunderstanding. In my opinion Huppes' Figure 5.1 neglects 
an additive constant in the formula used as a proxy for the supply of aca- 
demically-trained manpower. In addition, I have doubts with regard to the 
measure of technological development used by Huppes. His yardstick of the 
level of technology attained is taken proportional to industrial production 
(p. 80). But it is well known that higher technological levels cause a shift 
from industry to services. 
A similar ~ error I think I made myself when testing my original theory 
appears in Table 31 (Tinbergen, 1975, p. 32) where I took as the main 
demand factor for university-trained labour the percentage of population in 
manufacturing. It should have been the percentage in services. 
4. As a fourth subject in this section, the measurement of utility or per- 
sonal welfare will be considered. It is healthy for economists to study the 
results of Levy and Guttman (1975), who found that among the variables 
which are able to explain a considerable portion of the variance in welfare, 
economic variables play a modest role only: 13 percent of total and 16 
percent of explained by the six most important factors. 
Then, my own belief that utility depends negatively on what I called the 
"tension" between degrees of qualities required for one's job and actual 
degrees (Tinbergen, 1956) had not been borne out by most attempts I made 
so far to test it (Bouma et al, 1976 being one of them). 
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4 MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN THE FIELD OF THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC 
POLICY 
Continuing the process of focussing increasingly on income distribution 
policies, let us consider next the theory of economic policy. It is common- 
place to consider the aims or targets of economic policy as exogenous vari- 
ables. The most general aim dealt with in the traditional setup of the theory 
may be considered to be maximizing social welfare ~2, whose choice consti- 
tutes a value judgement. One well-known choice for ~2, recommended by 
Bergson, is that ~2 is a function of the welfare functions of all citizens, hence 
~(wj ) ,  j = 1 . . .  J ,  where J is the total number of citizens. 
Here the question may be asked whether additional elements have to be 
added to the w i. A well-known additional element is a "correction" of w], 
occurring in the shape of government opinions on consumption of merit 
goods or of goods deemed damaging to their consumers. Damaging oods 
have been taxed since ancient imes, the best-known examples being alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco products. In the Netherlands - and probably in many 
other countries - also sugar has been taxed for a long time, but the official 
justification in the nineteenth century was that it was considered a luxury 
good. Today we are hardly inclined to consider it as such, but in the mean- 
time the effect of consuming too much sugar on the quality of our teeth has 
been quantified: it has been found that dentists are spending 25 percent of 
their work activities counteracting those bad effects. One of the most impor- 
tant merit goods is compulsory schooling. 
A complex of popular misunderstandings is to be found concerning 
corrective action customary in most countries. Part or all of it is considered 
by quite a few citizens as "paternalistic" and "hence" undemocratic, all of 
which is "bad." It may be useful to formulate a criterion in order to state 
whether or not the type of corrective action discussed is indeed undemocratic 
or leading to a state of affairs which does not maximize the citizen's welfare. 
One criterion may be that to prevent citizens from doing something they 
would themselves deplore afterwards in fact constitutes a contribution to 
their welfare. The criterion makes sense if citizens are shortsighted, which is 
not an unrealistic assumption. 
It seems useful to add this criterion to Hennipman's treatment of the 
subject on p. 60 of the text quoted before. At the same time, it should be 
admitted that a considerable volume of empirical work remains to be done 
in order to give concrete content o the application of the criterion. 
Introduction of w/as components of the aims of economic policy implies, 
as observed correctly by Hennipman in the same text (p. 44), that not only 
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satisfaction - real or imagined - from consumption but also satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction from productive ffort enters the picture. Positive job saris- 
faction may even be called psychological income and may explain why in 
situations with negative money income certain types of producers, especially 
so-called small independents, are willing to continue production. 
Here we are touching on a subject mentioned by Vos (1980), following 
Rawls (1971), concerning thr role of freedom as an element of satisfaction. 
No doubt part of the satisfaction derived from labour is related to being 
independent or "free." But can we speak of the distribution of freedom, 
which according to Vos should also be fair? This requires measurement of
the degree or level of freedom attached to each position in society. I am not 
opposing this idea but inviting its advocates to come forward with a system 
of measurement. 
The construction of a social welfare function by a policy maker is 
analyzed by Helmers (1979), who uses a concept of "social weights" given to 
the welfare of more homogeneous social groups. He formualtes a number of 
assumptions in order to arrive at the evaluation of, for instance, an invest- 
ment project with given increases in incomes of various groups. The essence 
of the workable method he proposes consists of four assumptions as to how 
practical content can be given to an optimal income distribution with the aid 
of marginal utilities of the incomes of some standard social groups (fully 
employed unskilled workers, highly trained technicians, and people living 
at subsistence level). 
A last example of a misunderstanding in the general field of welfare 
definition: sometimes the statement is made that in tropical countries needs 
are less than in cold or temperate climates. This statement seems to neglect 
the disagreeable aspects of hot weather and the 
My guess is that optimal weather conditions do 
rather in sub-tropical or temperate surroundings. 
So far we have discussed, under the heading 
need for air conditioning. 
not prevail in tropical, but 
of the theory of economic 
policy, the aims or targets. The main problem to be solved by this theory is 
to determine the combination of changes in policy means (or instruments) by 
which a given set of aims or targets can be attained. The solution to this 
problem can be obtained with the aid of so-called policy models as illustrated 
in an authorative journal, the Journal of Policy Modelling. It is slightly 
ironical that I am among those who accepted the choice of that name, since 
I once sressed the fact that the same model can be used to solve analytical 
and political problems by changing the variables chosen as exogenous (Tin- 
bergen, 1956, p. 9, 123). This is a question of semantics, however, which 
need not cause misunderstanding. 
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By far more important is the rapid development and increasing sophistica- 
tion the subject matter we have shown. This may be illustrated by contribu- 
tions from J.A. Hartog, Nijkamp and Spronk (1979). Some of the innovations 
will be briefly mentioned. Instead of one policy maker ("the government"), 
there are many (for instance, "the ministers"; or more realistically the 
ministries, or, say, the directors-general of the ministries possibly working in 
combination with members of parliament). Each may have its own social 
welfare function, and the process of policy making consists of a set of steps, 
comparable with the steps of oligopolists as supposed by Cournot and later 
authors on monopolistic ompetition. In fact, the theory of games is the 
instrument o describe such processes (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1944). A possible misunderstanding that might arise here revolves around the 
fact that the "steps" referred to by the authors mentioned are often them- 
selves working hypotheses concerning the behaviour of the actors involved 
and should in fact be tested in the same way all reaction equations have been 
tested before. 
Another innovation is that policy makers as a rule are not aware of their 
maximizing effect on a welfare function; they do not see the functional 
relation the economist constructs out of a limited number of "states" about 
which policy makers know and which they prefer over other states of affairs. 
So they may be told by the experts (the planning agency staff) what (limited) 
choices are open to them and they may go through achain of choices leading 
to a preferred state. The similarity between these actions and the chains of 
actions taken by actors in a market will be clear. 
Finally, "satisficing" may replace maximizing, introducing an additional 
degree of freedom. 
5 MISUNDERSTANDINGS CONCERNING INCOME DISTRIBUTION POLICY 
Among the aims of economic policy, a change in income distribution may 
appear. This change itself may be quite different for different policy makers. 
The aim may be changes in the income of some groups of the population. 
Some parties will be in favour of, for instance, raising farm incomes. During 
the Great Depression this target played a role in several countries. At present 
in the European Community it is topical again. 
Marxist parties as a rule want to eliminate private income derived from 
the ownership of capital. A famous misunderstanding connected with this aim 
has been that for quite some time Marxist governments concluded that in the 
calculation of prices of products no costs for the use of capital should be 
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included. This led to the well-known situation that capital-intensive goods 
were relatively cheap and labour-intensive goods relatively expensive. 
An alternative aim of income distribution policy has been the establish- 
ment of an "equitable" income distribution. The definition of equity then 
becomes an important issue. Several definitions have been offered in the 
literature. The definition I prefer is that equity in income distribution is 
attained when all individuals considered are deriving from their jobs and their 
incomes equal satisfaction (or welfare, which I consider synonymous). 
This definition makes sense only when welfare can be measured; accordingly 
I belong to the group who think it can. Several alternative definitions are 
adhered to. One, often called liberalist, is that equity implies equality be- 
tween an individual's income and its contribution to the national prodUct. 
Another is that equity requires only that a number of minimum needs can be 
satisfied by all. A third defmition requires that all incomes be equal. Else- 
where (Tinbergen, 1978) I tried to show that under certain circumstances 
any two of the four definitions may lead to identical income distributions. 
Yet, in my opinion, the liberalist definition, whenever it does not coincide 
with one of the others, is based on a misunderstanding. To illustrate this 
statement, we may consider practically all situations which so far have 
prevailed even in highly developed countries. The overwhelming majority of 
individuals endowed by nature with high levels of intelligence or social 
intelligence derive from this endowment incomes considerably higher than 
most other incomes, with the exception of the owners of large amounts of 
capital. To consider these high incomes derived from natural endowments a  
equitable rests on the misunderstanding that natural endowments are distri- 
buted equitably over humankind. Nature is not equitable, but, on the con- 
trary, at times very cruel. 
In earlier publications I adhered to a definition sometimes called the 
"swapping principle": a situation of equity being defined as one where 
nobody wishes to swap places with anybody else. The misunderstanding 
which undermines this definition is that of the feasibility of swapping places. 
It is possible to let A have B's income and vice versa; to let A live in B's house 
and even have him offered the training course B went through, and vice 
versa. But it is not (yet?) possible to let A have B's innate qualities and 
B A's qualities, as would be necessary for a complete swapping of "places" 
in the sense relevant to our problems. 
A misunderstanding seems to exist also when G. Leduc (1977), in a dis- 
cussion of C. Morrisson's paper ead in the Institut de France (1977) observes 
that "M. Tinbergen . . . a soutenu . . ,  l'id6al quant ~ la justice sociale, est 
que chacun ait autant que son prochain." The impression created by this 
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statement is that equal income or equal wealth is meant. Only if the state- 
ment had been about equal welfare would M. Leduc have been right. 
Again another type of misunderstanding regarding the definition I favour 
is one which concerns the time at which equity can be attained. Defining 
equity does not imply the opinion that such equity can be established right 
away. Pen (1979) even - although co-author of our joint effort (1977) - 
seems to make his readers believe that I consider an equitable income distri- 
bution possible in the Netherlands in 1979. Elsewhere (Tinbergen 1975, 
1975a), I made it clear that equity "here and now" would only be possible 
if a lump-sum tax on innate capabilities were possible - quod non. 
A last misunderstanding about possible targets related to income distribi- 
tion is the specification of an optimal income ratio between highest and 
lowest incomes of, for instance, five to one. The misunderstanding consists of 
the formulation of this ratio without specifying what percentiles of the in- 
comes recipients have been chosen. Clearly a five-to-one ratio between the 
upper and lower one percent of income recipients is much less unequal than 
a five-to-one ratio between the upper and lower ten percent groups. 
An equitable income-and=job distribution is not, however, the only 
possible target of income distribution policy. Even if an equitable income 
distribution were attainable - i.e. if the tax just mentioned were feasible 
- the situation of equity might imply a total social welfare lower than 
possible. If an equitable income distribution is not feasible, the income 
distribution will in any case have to deviate from it, and the income distribu- 
tion target must be seen as part of the total set of targets considered, in 
combination with the instrument variables' values, to correspond to an 
optimal solution of the policy problem. 3 Elsewhere (Tinbergen, 1977, 1980) 
I developed models in" which some features relevant o income distribution 
policies have been given closer attention than before (1975). Thus, I genera- 
lized about some of the assumptions limiting the validity of previous work on 
the optimal income distribution. In more recent work the number of job 
characteristics and personality traits has no longer been limited to a few. 
The production function need not be specified. Education costs have been 
introducedas variables into a newer model used for the Netherlands in 
1962. Thus some of the limitations rightly criticized by Haveman (1977) 
3 I am using the terms "targets" and " instruments" which I prefer to restrict o quanti- 
tative aims and means and not to use for qualitative aims and means. This implies that in 
the present essay I deliberately restrict myself to changes within a given structure. In 
most examples of misunderstandings listed in this essay this restriction is not necessary, 
however. 
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have been reduced. Even so important limitations remain. Some of these 
have been removed in an admirable way by Ritzen (1977). Among the latter 
are (1) the constancy of physical capital; (2) the neglect of the costs of 
other than formal training and (3) the distribution of capital over individual 
owners. 
Alongside all the misunderstandings identified in this essay, it seems 
appropriate to finish by stating that, as usual, no misunderstanding prevails 
about the need for further esearch. Ars longa, vita brevis. 
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Summary 
MISUNDERSTANDINGS CONCERNING INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION POLICIES 
In this essay in honour of Professor P. Hennipman the latter's clarity and pre- 
cision of expression are chosen as an example of how to avoid misunderstanding 
of  his publications. As counterexamples some twenty-odd misunderstandings 
are set out by the essay's author in the field of income distribution policies, 
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ranging from that specific subject to the theory of economic policy, to 
economic science and to science as a whole. Several of these misunderstand- 
ings are due to the essay's author, while others seem to prevail either among 
the general public or among scientists. 
